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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HOW MISSOURI STACKS UP IN PROTECTING TRANSGENDER
YOUTHS AT SCHOOL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERING VIEWS
OF TITLE IX AND STATE-LEVEL PROTECTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 2015, national news media erupted with stories surrounding
a controversy that arose out of a school district in Hillsboro, Missouri. 1 Lila
Perry is seventeen years old and just like every other girl in high school, except
that she was not born biologically a female. 2 Lila began to feel like she was
supposed to have been a female when she turned thirteen, and four years later,
she decided to appear as a female at school. 3 Lila had previously presented
herself as a homosexual male, but now wished to be viewed and addressed as a
female. 4 She began to refer to herself as transgender female, and outwardly
expressed herself as a female with new clothing, hair, and makeup. 5 Before the
2015-2016 school year began she consulted with the Hillsboro Senior High
administration about her identity. 6 The school decided to allow her to use the
gender neutral faculty bathroom due to her new transgender identity. 7 Wanting
to avoid segregating herself by using the gender neutral bathroom, Lila asked
the administration, was given permission, and began using the women’s locker
rooms and restrooms. 8 “I am a girl. I am not going to be pushed away to
another bathroom,” she told a CNN affiliate. 9
At the school board meeting on August 27, 2015, several angered parents
expressed their discontent with the school’s decision to allow Lila, an
individual who is anatomically male, to change and use the restrooms in the
presence of their young daughters at Hillsboro Senior High School. 10 One

1. Emmanuela Grinberg, Bathroom Access for Transgender Teen Divides Missouri Town,
CNN (Sept. 5, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/03/living/missouri-transgender-teen
-feat [hereinafter Grinberg].
2. Grinberg, supra note 1.
3. Grinberg, supra note 1.
4. Grinberg, supra note 1.
5. See Char Adams, Transgender Teen on the Protests Against Her Using the Girls’
Bathroom: ‘This Is More About Hate than It Is Anything Else’, PEOPLE (Sept. 3, 2015, 1:45 AM),
http://www.people.com/article/lila-perry-transgender-hate-high-school-protest.
6. Grinberg, supra note 1.
7. Grinberg, supra note 1.
8. Grinberg, supra note 1.
9. Grinberg, supra note 1.
10. Grinberg, supra note 1.
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parent asked the board to stop extending privileges to “confused teenagers who
want to be something they are not sexually” at other students’ expenses.11
Other parents chose to insinuate that the board was trying to avoid liability by
refusing to make a policy regarding transgender students’ bathroom use. 12 One
bold parent even asked which side it would support if he were to sue them for
violating his right to “parent” as he chooses. 13
Prior to this instance, there is no record that the school had previously
created a policy on bathroom access or whether it preferred students to use a
particular restroom based on their biological sex or based on choice. 14 The
concerned parents argued on behalf of their children’s rights for privacy,
focusing on the differences in Lila’s physical anatomy. 15 After stating their
discontent, they adamantly urged the school to adopt a policy which would
only allow students to use the restrooms of the gender they were born with or a
gender neutral restroom. 16
In response to this controversy being raised, three of the longest-serving
members of the school board resigned, including the President, Vice President,
and Director. 17 Although the assumption is these members resigned due to
their personal feelings regarding this issue, none of these school board
members specifically stated this as reason. 18 While the President and Vice
President’s letter did not include a reason for their resignations 19, Director Bo
Harrison cited “strained philosophical differences” as his main reason for his
resignation. 20 When Harrison was contacted for comment he mentioned he had
strong feelings about the transgender controversy, but said he resigned because
he had been treated unfairly by the school board and school staff for years. 21

11. Grinberg, supra note 1.
12. Grinberg, supra note 1.
13. Grinberg, supra note 1.
14. See Hillsboro Senior High School Student Handbook 2016-2017 (2016), https://drive.
google.com/file/d/0B4OkI17orl7sN09zOWhwV2VWT2c/view. In the forty-seven page, 20162017 edition of the school’s student handbook, there is no mention of any policy regarding
bathroom or locker room accessibility or usage. See also Hillsboro High School Faculty
Handbook 2016-2017 (2016), http://media.wix.com/ugd/010903_109db1ec597a401595960c7d71
08cf41.pdf.
15. Grinberg, supra note 1.
16. Grinberg, supra note 1.
17. Kim Bell & Lily Fowler, Three Members of Hillsboro School Board Resign Amid
Controversy Over Transgender Student, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/three-members-of-hillsboro-school-board-resign-a
mid-controversy-over/article_a8408d86-71a2-5327-bf70-868417cac39e.html [hereinafter Bell &
Fowler].
18. Bell & Fowler, supra note 17.
19. Bell & Fowler, supra note 17.
20. Bell & Fowler, supra note 17.
21. Bell & Fowler, supra note 17.
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That same week over 150 students walked out of class protesting Lila’s
ability to use the women’s restrooms. 22 It was clear the town was divided on
the issue when a large crowd of supporters of Lila and LBGT rights organized
a rally in Hillsboro Park, where Lila herself addressed the issue, determined to
stand up for the rights of transgender youths across the nation. 23 Lila stated, “I
believe that there are places like Hillsboro all over the county where young
people are hurting, feeling alone, and being discriminated against because of
who they are.” 24 Despite uproar from parents, students, and the community, the
school board refused to make a decision on whether the policy suggestions
would be implemented. 25 The district’s superintendent, Aaron Cornman, stated
that the district intends to promote tolerance and acceptance of all of its
students, as well as continuing to educate its students on how to respect and
tolerate their fellow students. 26
Although Ms. Perry has not alleged any sort of discrimination claim
against the school at this point in time, 27 if the school were to adopt the policy
suggested by the parents denying Lila access to the women’s restrooms and
locker rooms or any other school programming based on her sex, she may,
under federal law, assert a claim of sex discrimination under Title IX. 28 Under
Title IX, educational institutions who receive federal funding are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of sex and, thus, Title IX provides relief for
those individuals who have been discriminated against. 29 By denying Lila
access to the women’s locker room and facilities she could allege disparate
treatment and disparate impact caused by the district’s policy based on her sex
or gender identity as a transgender individual. 30
This comment will propose an outcome for how a Missouri court would
rule on Ms. Perry’s potential claim for disparate treatment under Title IX. It
will do so by addressing the “bathroom problem” 31 within the context of the
evolution of Title IX and three major conceptions of how Title IX should be
applied. Section II of this comment will discuss whether sex encompasses
gender identity by providing an overview of what it means to be transgender.

22. Brynn Tannehill, The Classmates of Trans Teen Lila Perry Should be Ashamed,
ADVOCATE (Sept. 14, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2015/9/14/class
mates-trans-teen-lila-perry-should-be-ashamed.
23. Grinberg, supra note 1.
24. Grinberg, supra note 1.
25. Grinberg, supra note 1.
26. Grinberg, supra note 1.
27. Grinberg, supra note 1.
28. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013).
29. Id.
30. See infra Part III (discussing Title IX in more detail).
31. Referring to the common term for the issue of what bathroom use policy is appropriate
and non-discriminatory for transgender students in federally funded educational facilities.
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This section will begin to introduce how the courts have viewed “sex” and
“gender” within the confines of Title IX and how this has evolved over the
years. We will then delve into the history and background of Title IX in
Section III, in order to better understand the legislative intent behind the
adoption of Title IX. Section IV of this comment will then suggest there are
three different views or applications of Title IX within the courts, and will
propose a solution for the bathroom problem based upon those views. This
section will also evaluate how a Missouri court would rule in Ms. Perry’s
hypothetical claim and which view of Title IX it would be most likely to take.
In the end, this comment will put forth a proposition for change in order to
help solve this problem once and for all.
II. DOES “SEX” ENCOMPASS GENDER AND GENDER IDENTITY?
Biologically and psychologically there can be a disconnect between
anatomical sex and gender. 32 Justice Scalia himself, a well-known
conservative, acknowledged the difference between sex and gender by stating,
“[t]he word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or
attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to
the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and
masculine to male.” 33
Sex and gender, a subjectively adopted view that a person is a man or a
woman, constitute a large part of the human identity. 34 Typically this selfconcept of sex and gender originates at birth, but may not always be in
accordance with anatomical sex. 35 Catharine A. McKinnon, a noted feminist,
lawyer, scholar, and activist, wrote in her casebook entitled Sex Equality:
Gender identity can conform to the body, or parts of it, or be at odds with it, or
some features of it. Whether or not it conforms to the body, gender identity
generally appears to be quite inflexible; indeed, it usually seems more difficult
36
to alter than the physical body.

Further recognizing that gender identity is not something that can be
chosen or changed, psychologists have determined when an individual’s
anatomical sex and gender identity differ the individual is suffering from a
disorder they call gender dysphoria. 37 For a person to be diagnosed with
gender dysphoria, there must be a marked difference between the individual’s

32. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 213 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter
MACKINNON].
33. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 213.
35. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 213.
36. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 213.
37. THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.85 (Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n, 5th ed. 2013).
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expressed/experienced gender and the gender others would assign him or her,
and it must continue for at least six months. 38 Those who suffer from gender
dysphoria, more commonly referred to as transgender individuals, manifest
their identity in a variety of ways, including strong desires to be treated as the
other gender or to be rid of one’s sex characteristics, or a strong conviction that
one has feelings and reactions typical of the other gender. 39
A.

What It Means To Be “Transgender”: A Deeper Understanding

All of these descriptions of sex and gender frequently used to help
understand and apply basic rights to transgender individuals, although wellresearched and educated, do not provide a full enough understanding of what
“transgender” means. The category transgender has come to be understood as a
collective category of identity which incorporates a diverse array of male- and
female-bodied gender variant people who had previously been understood as
distinct kinds of persons, including self-identified transsexuals and
transvestites, but also many others. 40 Historically, even as recently as the
1970s, these individuals were considered part of the “gay community,” both by
insiders and outsiders. 41 However, over the past several decades there has been
a radical transformation of the classifications of gender and sexuality spectrum
in the United States, creating a wide array of individuals with particular
characteristics that may not fall into the legally established protected classes. 42
The term “transgender” was not technically coined until the 1990s, 43 but
most authors will attribute this term to Virginia Price who used the term
“transgenderist” in the 1970s to describe individuals who, like her, lived full
time in a gender other than that to which they were ascribed at birth, but
without surgical intervention. 44 Advocates for cross-gender identification in
the 1990s began to view gender-variant identity more radically than in the
1970s. 45 With help of advocates like Holly Boswell 46, transgender began to
mean something more than a category between “transsexual” and
“transvestite” and became an alternative to binary gender. 47 As this radical

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. DAVID VALENTINE, IMAGINING TRANSGENDER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A CATEGORY 4
(2007) [hereinafter VALENTINE].
41. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 15.
42. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 15.
43. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 4.
44. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 32.
45. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 32.
46. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 32.
47. See Holly Boswell, The Transgender Alternative, CHRYSALIS Q. 1(2): 29–31 (1991).
“The middle ground I am referring to is transgenderism. I realize this term (heretofore vague) also
encompasses the entire spectrum: crossdresser to transsexual person. But for the purpose of this
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view of the category continued to progress, “transgender” became a collective
or umbrella category of gender identity, which communities like social
services, mental health, and academia used to wrestle with the myriad of
various meanings and definitions of gender variance. 48
B.

Controlling Precedent: Price Waterhouse and Its Progeny

With the ever growing and changing definitions of sex, gender, and gender
identity, it is understandable why the applications within the court system vary.
Title VII and Title IX protect individuals from being subject to discrimination
on the basis of sex, among other protected classes. 49 However, many of these
individuals’ claims for sex discrimination revolve around some characteristic
different than their biological sex, like their sexuality, gender or gender
identity. In addressing how gender discrimination may qualify as sex
discrimination for purposes of Title VII, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins has since become the controlling precedent. 50
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Price Waterhouse that
sex discrimination includes discrimination based on “sex stereotyping,” or a
person’s perceived nonconformity with gender stereotypes. 51 Prior to this, the
majority of courts who had considered the issue had ruled that those who did
not conform to gender norms and transgender individuals were not protected
by Title VII. 52 The Court held that Price Waterhouse, as an employer, had
failed to prove that an employment decision to postpone a promotion to
partnership for Hopkins, a female employee, had any other valid reason
besides sex discrimination. 53 Hopkins had alleged she was denied the
promotion because of an attitude supported by comments that she was not
feminine enough, or “needed to go to charm school” and, thus, was not
conforming to the sex stereotypes. 54 The Court reasoned that because
article—and for what I hope will be a continuing dialogue—I shall attempt to define transgender
as a viable option between crossdresser and transsexual person, which also happens to have a firm
foundation in the ancient tradition of androgyny.” Id.
48. VALENTINE, supra note 41, at 33. A suggested “relatively modest list” of kinds of people
that fall under this category includes: transsexuals, transvestites, cross-dressers, men or women of
transgender or transsexual experience, drag queens, drag kings, female or male impersonators,
genderqueers, intersexuals, hermaphrodites, fem queens, girls, boys, trannies, feminine gay men,
butch lesbians, male-to-female, female-to-male, female embodied masculine persons, and even,
simply, men or women. Id.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013).
50. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
51. Id.
52. Dana Beyer & Jillian T. Weiss with Riki Wilchins, New Title VII and EEOC Rulings
Protect Transgender Employees, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER (2014), http://transgenderlawcen
ter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/TitleVII-Report-Final012414.pdf.
53. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–52.
54. Id. at 256.
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aggressiveness is a trait the partners require for promotion, the employer’s
objections to Hopkins’s aggressiveness placed her in an “intolerable and
impermissible catch 22.” 55
The Court had previously recognized that Congress had intended to
prohibit this type of discrimination based on sex stereotypes. 56 In its analysis,
the Court stated that remarks at work based on sex stereotypes alone do not
prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision. 57 Rather
in these circumstances, the plaintiff must show that the employer actually
relied on her gender in making its decision, but it need not be the sole factor in
the decision. 58 The Court ultimately held that the employment decision
constituted sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 59 By agreeing that “Title VII lifts women out of this bind,” the Court
interpreted sex discrimination to include not just discrimination on one’s sex in
the sense of being biologically male or female, but also discrimination on the
basis of how one presents one’s gender relative to one’s biological sex. 60
Since the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, the holding has
been understood and expounded to cover more individuals than the Court
initially addressed. Although there are currently no explicit statutory
protections in federal law against homosexual or transgender discrimination,
many courts have held that Price Waterhouse’s ban on “assuming or insisting
that [employees] match the stereotype associated with their group” 61 forbids
employers from discriminating against gender-deviant LGBT employees. 62
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has also since ruled
that discrimination against transgender workers categorically violates Price
Waterhouse. 63
Although the decision technically only binds in Title VII employment
discrimination cases, this definition of discrimination based on gender and sex
stereotyping has been used in many transgender discrimination cases outside of
55. Id. at 251.
56. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978). “In
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.’” Id.
57. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Erin E. Buzuvis, “On the Basis of Sex”: Using Title IX to Protect Transgender Students
from Discrimination in Education, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 219, 230 (2013) [hereinafter
Buzuvis].
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
62. Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 400 (Nov. 2014).
63. Id. at 401 (referring to the decision in Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821,
2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012)).
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the Title VII context. In a case about sexual violence against a transgendered
inmate by a prison guard under the Gender Motivated Violence Act, the Ninth
Circuit ruled under Price Waterhouse that sex encompasses both sex – that is,
the biological differences between men and women – and gender. 64 It further
went on to say that discrimination based on failure to meet gender norms, or
because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman, is also
forbidden. 65 The court held under the acts, the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ have
become interchangeable. 66
The Price Waterhouse gender nonconformity interpretation of “because of
sex” has already proven influential in Title IX cases, although not necessarily
in cases with transgender students. 67 In Montgomery v. Independent School
District 709, a student alleged that he had been harassed on the basis of his
gender and sexual orientation. 68 Despite the fact that the student was targeted
for what others believed to be his sexual orientation, the court determined that
the extent to which this harassment targeted the way he presented his gender
gave him a right to relief under Title IX and Price Waterhouse precedent. 69
Since Montgomery, many plaintiffs, both male and female, have prevailed in
harassment cases by invoking Price Waterhouse. 70 Even in cases where
plaintiffs’ cases were dismissed, such outcomes were due to insufficient
evidence that gender nonconformity motivated the harassment, not a
disagreement about whether “because of sex” incorporates gender
nonconformity as a matter of law. 71
Although Price Waterhouse controls how courts should rule in cases where
there has been discrimination based on sex stereotyping and gender identity in
Title VII cases, 72 there has been debate over how the precedent should be
applied in cases with transgender discriminations simply because the Supreme
Court may not have imagined the implications of this decision on transgender

64. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Buzuvis, supra note 61, at 233.
68. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1083 (D. Minn. 2000).
69. Id. at 1083.
70. Buzuvis, supra note 61, at 234 (citing Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438 (6th
Cir. 2009); Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Ill. 2008); Riccio v. New
Haven Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2006); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch.
Dist No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952 (D. Kan. 2005)).
71. Buzuvis, supra note 61, at 234 (citing to several cases with these outcomes, e.g., Wolfe
v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2011); A.E. ex rel. Evans v.
Harrisburg Sch. Dist. No. 7, No. 6:1 1-CV-6255-TC, 2012 WL 4794314 (D. Or. Oct. 9, 2012);
Estate of Carmichael v. Galbraith, No. 3:11-CV-0622-D, 2012 WL 4442413 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
2012); Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Sch., No. 1210354, 2012 WL 2450805 (E.D. Mich. June 27,
2012)).
72. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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rights. Though Price Waterhouse did not involve a transgender plaintiff,
transgender plaintiffs are among those who have prevailed under this
interpretation. 73
C. How Would a Title IX Claim in a “Bathroom Problem” Case Be
Decided?
Many LGBT advocates caution against giving too much attention to the
“bathroom question,” given evidence from a growing number of school
districts suggesting that transgender-friendly policies work. 74 Over the past
few years, several similar school policies throughout the nation have been
called into question to determine what protections and rights transgender
students have at public schools. 75 These cases allege discrimination on the
basis of sex under Title IX. 76 Even using Price Waterhouse to apply in Title IX
cases, many courts continue to apply these standards in differing ways
depending on how each court views Title IX. 77 Without direct guidance from
the legislation or the Supreme Court on how to rule in this particular instance,
a number of cases at the district and state court levels have interpreted
nondiscrimination laws to apply to transgender students, granting them equal
access to school facilities, including bathrooms. 78 However, there are many
courts who have not adopted this rule.
Recently, in September of 2015, this very issue of restroom and lockerroom access sex discrimination due to a student’s transgender gender identity
was addressed in Virginia. 79 Sixteen-year-old transgender male Gavin Grimm
sued the Gloucester County School Board for the right to use the men’s
bathroom. 80 The school had a policy requiring that men and women use

73. Buzuvis, supra note 61, at 230. In Smith v. City of Salem, the court drew a parallel
between an employer who discriminates against women because they do not wear dresses or
makeup and employers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses or makeup, or
otherwise act femininely. If the former is an example of sex discrimination, as Price Waterhouse
says, so too is the latter. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004).
74. Grinberg, supra note 1.
75. Michael E. Miller, Feds say Illinois school district broke law by banning transgender
student from girls’ locker room, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/03/feds-say-illinois-school-district-broke-law-by-banning-transstudent-from-girls-locker-room/ [hereinafter Miller].
76. Id. See also Glenn v. Brumby, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (holding that
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects transgender government
employees from discrimination on the basis of their transgender identity).
77. See infra Part IV (defining and laying out three differing views under Title IX).
78. Id.
79. Miller, supra note 76. The article goes so far as to call this phenomena “Bathroom
Wars.” Id.
80. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2015 WL 5560190, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2015).
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separate bathrooms and locker rooms, and denied Gavin access to the men’s
room because he was biologically female. 81 The United States Department of
Justice filed an amicus brief and a statement of interest in this case in an effort
to correct certain views of the protections of Title IX for transgender
students. 82 After discussing precedent set forth in Price Waterhouse and its
progeny, the Statement of Interest went on to say: “Under Title IX,
discrimination based on a person’s gender identity, a person’s transgender
status, or a person’s nonconformity to sex stereotypes constitutes
discrimination based on sex. As such, prohibiting a student from accessing the
restrooms that match his gender identity is prohibited sex discrimination under
Title IX.” 83
Despite these statements from the Department of Justice, the Eastern
District of Virginia held the school’s bathroom policy did not violate Title IX,
citing a Department of Education regulation allowing for separation of
bathroom and locker rooms on the basis of sex. 84 In doing so, it stated its major
motivation as protecting the other students’ constitutional right to privacy. 85
Federal officials continue to attempt to address this issue. The Department
of Education released a document on December 1, 2014 that demonstrated its
intent to protect transgender individuals. 86 While simply answering frequently
asked questions of how Title IX is applied in these “single-sex classes” 87 for
transgendered students, the Department of Education suggested that gender
identity discrimination is sex discrimination. 88
How do the Title IX requirements on single-sex classes apply to transgender
students? Answer: All students, including transgender students and students
who do not conform to sex stereotypes, are protected from sex-based

81. Id. at *2–3.
82. See Statement of Interest of the United States, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty.
Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2015 WL 5560190 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2015), (No. 4:15cv54), 2015 WL
5560190, ECF No. 28.
83. Id. at *1–2.
84. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 2015 WL 5560190, at *6. The court cited a regulation of the Code
of Federal Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, which states a recipient may provide separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of
one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex. Id.
85. Id. at *13.
86. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE
IX AND SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CLASSES AND EXTRACURRICULAR
ACTIVITIES 25 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafter OCR, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS].
87. OCR, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 87, at 1. This document refers to singlesex classes and extracurricular activities that are covered by 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b). The Code of
Federal Regulations allows a federal funding recipient that operates a non-vocational
coeducational elementary or secondary school to provide non-vocational single-sex classes or
extracurricular activities, subject to certain requirements. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b).
88. OCR, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 87.
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discrimination under Title IX. Under Title IX, a recipient generally must treat
transgender students consistent with their gender identity in all aspects of the
planning, implementation, enrollment, operation, and evaluation of single-sex
89
classes.

Furthering this report is an investigation from the Department of Education
Office of Civil Rights from a case with strikingly similar facts to the issue
arising out of Hillsboro. 90 In 2013, the administration of District 211 in
Palatine, Illinois refused to let a transgender female to change in the female
locker rooms before and after her physical education class. 91 The district
instead allowed the aforementioned student, named “Student A” in reports, to
change in a single stall restroom only for her access to be unlocked before her
PE class, swim classes, and athletic activities and to be locked up when she
was finished. 92 Student A filed a complaint against District 211 in December
of 2013 alleging discrimination based on her sex in violation of Title IX. 93
After a two-year investigation, the Department of Education Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) released their report on November 2, 2015, finding that the
school’s policies were in violation of Title IX for excluding Student A from
participation in and denying her the benefits of its education program,
providing services to her in a different manner, subjecting her to different rules
of behavior, and subjecting her to different treatment on the basis of sex. 94 The
Office for Civil Rights cited the regulation implementing Title IX, at 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.33 in making its determination, which provides that a recipient may
provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,
but such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such
facilities provided for students of the other sex. 95 It went on to proclaim that all
students, including transgender students, are protected from sex-based

89. OCR, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 87.
90. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Case No. 05-14-1055 (Nov. 2, 2015)
[hereinafter OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055].
91. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at 1-2.
92. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at 4. However, Student A felt this segregated
her more because she would have to walk out and around all of the locker rooms before entering
the gymnasium to not draw extra attention to herself. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91,
at 5.
93. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at 1.
94. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at While the Office for Civil Rights
recognizes the District’s reasoning that in putting these policies into place it was trying to protect
the constitutional privacy rights of all of its students, the District already had installed privacy
curtains for changing in its locker rooms, which would be sufficient to protect those privacy
rights of individuals who did not want to change out in the open. However, the District had still
denied Student A access to the locker rooms to change behind these privacy curtains and had
thusly subjected her to stigma and different treatment based upon her sex. OCR, Case No. 05-141055, supra note 91, at 12.
95. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at 9.
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discrimination under Title IX. 96 The report stated that the school’s denial of
her access to these facilities “has also meant that, in order to satisfy her
graduation requirements and receive a high school diploma, Student A has had
no other option but to accept being treated differently than other students by
the District.” 97
Despite the Department of Education and Department of Justice’s attempts
to show their intention to include gender identity as a basis for sex
discrimination, courts have continued to struggle with this issue. Several courts
have thus looked to the history and legislative intent of Title IX to solve the
problem.
III. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF TITLE IX: DECADES OF CHANGE
As the civil rights movement was reaching its peak, Congress enacted The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made great strides in attempting to eliminate
discrimination based on religion, race, origin, and color. 98 The Act was the
first public law to acknowledge the difference in employment relations
between men and women and prohibited discrimination based on sex in
employment decisions with Title VII. 99 As the women’s civil rights movement
gained momentum, sex bias and discrimination in schools emerged as a major
public policy concern. 100 As more Americans were beginning to take notice of
the employment opportunities and earning differences between men and
women, they began to look at the educational opportunities provided to
women. 101 By looking into the nation’s colleges and universities, many found
inequalities that, in effect, inhibited the progress of women. 102
As a result, advocacy groups began to file class action lawsuits against
these colleges and universities, as well as the federal government, complaining
of an industry-wide pattern of sex bias against women who were students or
worked in colleges and universities. 103 As a result, a special House
Subcommittee on Education met in the summer of 1970, where Edith Green,
chairperson of the committee, introduced a bill which unsuccessfully attempted
to add a prohibition on sex discrimination to the Education Amendments of
1971. 104 Title IX was introduced in the Senate by Senator Birch Bayh the next
96. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at 9.
97. OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91, at 10.
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
99. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1964).
100. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP. OF JUSTICE, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE 16 (Jan. 11, 2001)
[hereinafter CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE].
101. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101.
102. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101.
103. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101.
104. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 17.
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year, who explained that its purpose was to combat “the continuation of
corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women in the American
educational system.” 105 On June 23, 1972, after several months of debate
between the House and Senate 106, President Nixon signed Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 into law, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 107
Title IX prohibits educational institutions from discriminating on the basis
of sex. 108 The Title applies to all aspects of education programs or activities
operated by those institutions receiving federal financial assistance 109,
including colleges, universities, elementary and secondary schools. 110 Title IX
is “a comprehensive federal law that has removed many barriers that once
prevented people, on the basis of sex, from participating in educational
opportunities and careers of their choice.” 111
A.

Relief Under Title IX: A Brief Overview to Title IX and Transgender
Issues

Title IX recognizes three general types of prohibited discrimination: (1)
disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) retaliation. 112 Disparate
treatment actions are those that treat similarly situated persons differently on
the basis of a prohibited classification. 113 To establish disparate treatment, one
needs to show that similarly situated individuals were treated differently
because of, or on the basis of their sex. 114 Disparate impact focuses on the
consequences of a facially sex-neutral policy or practice, rather than on the
intent to cause sex based results like disparate treatment. 115 Analyzing

105. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972). “[A] strong and comprehensive measure is needed to
provide women with solid legal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is
serving to perpetuate second class citizenship for American women.” Id. at 5804.
106. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 18–19.
107. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 7,19.
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.
109. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 592 n.8 (1984) (holding that Title IX is
program-specific and only applies to the particular portion of a recipient’s program that received
financial assistance). Congress then passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 overturning
Grove City, which extended the definition of “program or activity” to include all operations of the
facility receiving financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2015).
110. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 7.
111. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 7.
112. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 57.
113. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 57.
114. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 58. The decision maker must be aware
of the complainant’s sex and took action, wholly or partially, based on their sex. CRD, TITLE IX
LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 58.
115. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 63.
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disparate impact actions, the focus is on the results of the actions taken rather
than the underlying intent. 116 Retaliation as a cause of action under Title IX
ensures that beneficiaries are willing and able to participate in the enforcement
of their own rights without fear of what might happen if a claim is filed. 117
Any institution’s retaliation against a person who has filed a complaint or who
assists enforcement agencies in discharging their investigative duties violates
Title IX. 118
Most often claims of sex discrimination arise under a disparate treatment
theory because there is a clear difference in treatment because of sex.
However, in many cases with transgender individuals, these claims will arise
under both disparate treatment and disparate impact. 119 Once alleged, in order
to find sex discrimination, a court would need to find that the claimant was
excluded from participation in, denied benefits for, or discriminated against on
basis of sex by any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance 120 in order to grant relief under Title IX.
B.

The Evolution of On The Basis of Sex in Relation to Transgender
Individuals

Title IX reads “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 121 While many courts have yet to hear a case of
transgender sex discrimination under Title IX, the courts who have addressed it
are split on how to apply precedent set forth, due to the many differing views
of what sex should be protected under Title IX. Up until the late 1980s, there
was a debate centering on whether discrimination on the basis of sex is in
reference to only the basis of anatomical sex or if it also includes gender
identity.
In determining whether there is sex discrimination, courts have
traditionally viewed sex and gender as being based upon biological and
anatomical sex. 122 Many courts looked to precedent from a 1984 Seventh
Circuit case, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, in which the court determined that the
plain meaning of on the basis of sex in Title VII implies that it is unlawful to

116. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 63.
117. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 70.
118. CRD, TITLE IX LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 101, at 57.
119. See OCR, Case No. 05-14-1055, supra note 91 (where both gender neutral policies
created a disparate impact on the student and the outright treatment of the student was disparate).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2015).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. Of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp.
3d 657, 670 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
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discriminate against women because they are women and against men because
they are men. 123 The court concluded “a prohibition against discrimination
based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder or discontent
with the sex into which they were born.” 124
Twenty-six years after Title IX was enacted, in 1998, the Supreme Court
further addressed the intent of Congress. 125 In Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, the Court stated that Title IX was enacted with
two principal purposes in mind: (1) to avoid use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices, and (2) to provide individual citizens effective
protection against those practices. 126 Looking at this declaration of intent,
many would assume the broad use of the term “citizens” would protect all
citizens from discrimination. However, many courts have analyzed this intent
in conjunction with a plain reading of the statute to derive the intent of the
legislature, similar to that of the reading in Ulane. Title IX’s plain language
does not provide a basis for a transgender status claim as it makes no direct
reference to gender or gender identity. 127 In its plain terms “on the basis of
sex” means nothing more than male and female, under the traditional binary
conception of sex consistent with one’s birth or biological sex. 128 Thus, when
analyzing under legislative intent, many courts have in the past ruled
narrowly, 129 finding that transgender status is not a protected class under Title
IX nor does it fall under discrimination on the basis of sex.
As mentioned throughout this comment, the major Supreme Court
precedent from Price Waterhouse in 1988 changed the conversation. It is now
commonly understood that the term sex discrimination also encompasses
gender and gender norms, and, thus, gender identity. 130 The Supreme Court in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins ruled that for the purposes of sex discrimination
under Title VII, discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination
based on gender stereotyping, or characteristics often referred to as “gender
123. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
124. Id.
125. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S 274 (1998).
126. Id. at 286.
127. See Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676–77. The court was sympathetic to the issue, but
mentioned that it could do nothing about the application of the Title as is. The court went on to
state “The exclusion of gender identity from the language of Title IX is not an issue for this court
to remedy. It is within the province of Congress – and not this court – to identify those
classifications which are statutorily prohibited.” Id.
128. Id.
129. See Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding
that the word “sex” is to be given its traditional definition rather than an expansive one; holding
because Congress has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals, discrimination based on
one’s transsexualism does not fall within the purview of the Act in a Title VII case).
130. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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norms,” 131 which has hence been applied to protect transgender individuals
from discrimination based on their transgender status.
IV. THE THREE DIFFERING VIEWS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
While there is a general consensus that discrimination based on sex or
gender violates both Title VII and Title IX, there remains a variety of views on
how these provisions should be applied. These varying views continue to be
represented in the varying outcomes within different courts for issues like
discrimination on the basis of sex for homosexual and transgender individuals.
This comment suggests there are three viewpoints courts will take when
deciding Title IX cases that have evolved since the adoption of Title IX. The
first view is that of the people who say that Title IX is designed to “protect the
weaker sex” and to ensure that females are allowed the same opportunities as
males. The second view is that of the people who say that Title IX is designed
to create equality between both men and women despite their differences, and
should work to ensure equal opportunities for both males and females. The
third and final view is that of the people who say that Title IX should be read
in a gender-blind manner to ensure that all sexes and genders, are viewed and
treated the same without specifically addressing their sex or gender as a reason.
A.

Those Who Say “Protect the Weaker Sex”: A Parental View

Under this view, the idea is that women have been classified as needing to
be protected. Proponents of this view suggest that females are often taken
advantage of and that Title IX is designed specifically to protect females from
such hardships. This view often looks to remove barriers for females to
opportunities that males often have.
At the most basic level, the triggers for the enactment of Title IX and the
intent of Congress in enacting Title IX seem to align most with this view. The
Department of Education declares the primary objective of Title IX is “to
avoid the use of federal money to support sex discrimination in education
programs and to provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices.” 132 Women had to overcome a significant amount of barriers to
receive the same education and educational programming that men received. 133
A large push for Title IX came from the realm of college athletics. 134 Before

131. Id.
132. Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, JUSTICE
(Aug. 7. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/overview-title-ix-education-amendments-1972-20-usc1681-et-seq.
133. See supra Part III.
134. Title IX Enacted, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/title-ixenacted.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017] HOW MISSOURI STACKS UP IN PROTECTING TRANSGENDER YOUTH AT SCHOOL

159

Title IX was enacted, there were very few opportunities for women athletes. 135
The NCAA offered no athletic scholarships for women and held no
championships for women’s teams. 136 “Title IX was designed to correct those
imbalances.” 137
This view suggests Title IX in itself is set out not to equalize the sexes in
publicly funded schools and programs, but rather to protect females in
particular from inequalities and from harassment. Schools are not required
merely to treat similarly situated students alike; rather, they must work to
remedy sexual harassment as well. 138 In requiring schools to do so, the Court
has imposed on schools a mandate that appreciates the damaging effects that
peer sexual harassment has on students’ education, particularly that of girls and
young women. 139 In doing so, schools are then required to attempt to equalize
educational opportunities that would otherwise be missed out on as a result of
peer sexual harassment. 140
Further, this view look to protect the privacy and modesty of females. In
looking at this view, it is important to point out the similarities to the
arguments of many of the parents in Hillsboro who stood up to the school
board claiming their daughters needed protection from this violation of
privacy. 141 One parent in particular said, “We believe the current situation
violates rights of other students. Girls have a right to privacy of their own
bodies, and parents have a right to raise their children the way they want.” 142
This was the view that was the sole motivation for the outcome in Grimm. 143
This court stated that by protecting the bodily privacy of the other students, the
school board was protecting a constitutional right, and cited to several cases
discussing the right to privacy one is guaranteed in his or her naked body. 144
The solution to the bathroom problem under this view is to enforce a strict
policy of bathroom use associated with the sex assigned to an individual at
birth, much like the decision from Grimm. 145 This solution has been suggested

135. Title IX Enacted, supra note 135.
136. Title IX Enacted, supra note 135.
137. Title IX Enacted, supra note 135.
138. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 26667 (2005) [hereinafter Cohen].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Grinberg, supra note 1.
142. Grinberg, supra note 1.
143. See G.G. ex rel Grimm, 2015 WL 5560190.
144. Id. at *13 (citing Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2011); Brannum v.
Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 2008); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 138–
39 (2d Cir. 2002); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)).
145. Id. at *1.
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by many courts. 146 Transgender individuals are not selectively excluded from
bathrooms, but they are excluded from certain bathrooms on the same basis as
all biological males and females, biological sexual assignment. 147 These courts
have consistently concluded that requiring individuals to use bathrooms
consistent with their birth or biological sex rather than their gender identity is
not discriminatory conduct in violation of federal and state constitutions and
statutes. 148 One court in particular even went so far as to say, “it would be a
stretch to conclude that a ‘restroom,’ in and of itself, is educational in nature
and thus an education program” as required to state a prima facie case under
the statute.” 149 Under this view, bathroom usage would also be monitored
closely, in particular to ensure the privacy of these young women was
protected. Asking transgender students, like Ms. Perry, to use a facility that of
their birth sex would not be considered discrimination based on sex under this
view.
B.

Those Who Say “Different But Equal”: A Different Sexes But Same
Treatment View

Under this view, the idea is that there are males and there are females.
Although slightly anatomically different, there are two sexes that are both
human and both deserve the same opportunities. The proponents of this view
typically see Title IX as a way to level out differences between males and
females. Under this view, both sexes should receive equal opportunities, rights,
and facilities and should be guaranteed the same protections under law.
Some of the most prevalent supporters of this view are those who support
feminist theory. Although there are differences between males and females, the
two should be equal. The most basic form of feminist theory takes root in
general principles of formal equality that can be traced back to the Aristotelian
ideal of ‘the same treatment of similar persons. 150 If one is the same, one is to
be treated the same; if one is different, one is to be treated differently. 151 This
concept of equality is empirical in that how one ought to be treated is based on
the way one is, but it is also symmetrical, as if two sides of an equation were

146. See, e.g. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97
F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D.
Ohio 2003); Hispanic Aids Forum v. Bruno, 16 A.D.3d 294, (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Goins v.
West Group, 635 N.W. 2d 717 (Minn. 2001); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F. 2d 416 (5th Cir.
1975); Doe v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 206-cv-1074-JCM-RJJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71204,
(D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2008).
147. Hispanic Aids Forum, 16 A.D.3d at 298.
148. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 681.
149. Doe, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71204 at *3.
150. Cohen, supra note 139, at 259.
151. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 4.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017] HOW MISSOURI STACKS UP IN PROTECTING TRANSGENDER YOUTH AT SCHOOL

161

conjoined with a mathematical = sign. 152 This theory of formal equality is a
principle of equal treatment: individuals who are alike should be treated alike,
according to their actual characteristics rather than assumptions made about
them based on stereotypes. 153
Seeing differences in sex and gender under this “different but equal” view,
a court analyzing Ms. Perry’s discrimination in Hillsboro would be most likely
to rule that the law should treat her the same regardless of her anatomical sex.
The Supreme Court holding in Personal Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, demonstrates this view of sex equality best in addressing a non-Title
IX or Title VII issue. 154 The case came from a discriminatory challenge to a
preference for hiring veterans based on proof that the preference impacted
women as a group more severely than men because women were less likely to
be veterans. 155 The Court found that the law treated individuals the same based
on sex: men and women with veterans’ preferences were treated equally, and
men and women without veterans’ preferences were treated equally. 156
The solution to the bathroom problem under this view is similar to what
many schools now offer. Males and females may use the restroom of their sex
at birth or may use a gender neutral or faculty restroom. A court with the
“different but equal” view may look to Feeney, and, thus, would likely only be
concerned with whether students had been treated equally under the law
regardless of their male or female anatomy. This view would also suggest, like
the first view, that transgender individuals are not selectively excluded from
bathrooms, but they are excluded from certain bathrooms on the same basis as
all biological males and females, biological sexual assignment. 157 In doing so,
the law is treating males and females in the same manner, and there is no
discrimination on the basis of sex. Asking transgender students, like Ms. Perry,
to use a gender-neutral facility or that of their birth sex would not be
considered discrimination based on sex under this view.
C. Those Who Say “Turn A Blind Eye”: A Gender Neutral View
The gender-blind or gender neutral view aims to be more about equality
regardless of sex or gender differences. Most proponents of this view say that
sex, gender, sexual orientation, or otherwise should not create different rights
or discrimination in the eyes of the law. Proponents of this view often see Title
IX’s prime function as being able to address many civil and human rights
concerns by removing discrimination based on labels based on sex or gender,

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 4.
Cohen, supra note 139, at 221.
See Personal Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Hispanic Aids Forum, 16 A.D.3d at 298.
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requiring equal and fair treatment for all, regardless of sex, gender, or gender
identity. This view of Title IX specifically considers gender identity due to
transgender status as a definitive part of “sex.”
Many proponents of a gender blind view under Title IX and in sex equality
have made correlations between sexism and racism. We know that it is wrong
to have racially segregated establishments or to discriminate based on race. But
segregation based on sex is common and unfortunately so is sex
discrimination. Richard Wasserstrom drew on this correlation by looking at
segregation of bathrooms. 158 “We know, for instance, that it is wrong, clearly
racist, to have racially segregated bathrooms. There is, however, no common
conception that it is wrong, clearly sexist, to have sexually segregated ones.” 159
The Supreme Court made a point to move towards a more gender neutral
or gender-blind rule of law in Reed v. Reed. 160 The case ruled on a state estate
law that specified males must be preferred to females when appointing
administrators of estates. 161 The Court required that legal sex distinctions have
a “rational basis” in order to be constitutional. 162 Catharine McKinnon, in her
casebook Sex Equality, went so far as to say that this ruling “[g]ave birth to the
modern constitutional movement for sex equality under law.” 163 This case was
further strengthened by Craig v. Boren. 164 The Court further required that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 165 Since
this ruling, it has been widely read as elevating gender neutrality to a more
demanding standard than before by requiring a stronger showing before sex
distinctions will be allowed. 166
Putting things into perspective, on its face, a solution to the bathroom
problem under this view would be to enforce a policy only permitting the use
of gender neutral facilities for everyone, regardless of sex or gender identity.
However, this is by no means a practical or economic solution to the bathroom
problem. A mandate of this kind would require all educational institutions to
renovate and remodel their restrooms and locker rooms to become individual,
single stalls. Perhaps a solution under this view is not necessarily to only allow

158. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to
the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 592 (1977).
159. Id.
160. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 76. “The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective
that is sought to be advanced by the operation of §§ 15-312 and 15-314.” Id.
163. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 218.
164. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
165. Id. at 197.
166. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 228.
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some sort of single stall, gender-neutral bathrooms, but may be something less
restrictive entirely. There have been many proposed solutions to this issue
trying to seek some sort of compromise, 167 but the simplest and most practical
solution to the bathroom problem under this view is to incorporate a
transgender-friendly policy that allows individuals to use the restroom and
locker room of their gender identity. Asking transgender students, like Ms.
Perry, to use a gender-neutral facility or that of their birth sex would certainly
be considered discrimination based on sex under this view.
D. Application: How Would a Missouri Court Rule?
Understanding that there is no clear federal protection at this point in time,
many states have decided to step in and address the discrimination and
bullying of transgendered individuals on their own through their state Human
Rights Commissions. Many of the recent school discriminations cases not only
arise from Title IX or Equal Protection claims, but will also include claims
under state discrimination or anti-bullying statutes. Although Missouri has
protected individuals from hate crimes based on sexual orientation including
gender identity, 168 the state legislature has not yet amended any of its
discrimination laws to address school discrimination practices or bullying
based on these qualifiers. 169 Missouri is one of only twenty-four states who
have yet to do so. 170 Without specific federal or state legislation to guide this
court in cases of Title IX discrimination of transgender individuals, it would
necessarily have to look to the authority set within its own circuit or by the
superior courts.
If Lila Perry, or another Missouri resident, were to bring a discrimination
claim under Title IX, it would appear within the Eighth Federal Circuit.
Hillsboro, Missouri falls within the Eastern District of Missouri, which, to this
day, has yet to address a transgender discrimination claim under either Title IX
or Title VII. This particular issue would be a case of first impression for the
District. Without district precedent, an Eastern District Missouri court would
likely look to precedent set forth by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for
binding precedent or to other district courts within the Eighth Circuit to find
persuasive precedent.
167. See Grinberg, supra note 1. One parent in Hillsboro even suggested some sort of
compromise by “maybe cordoning off a section of the girls’ locker room or designating some
restrooms ‘transgender-friendly’ so students know what to expect.”
168. MO. REV. STAT. § 577.035 (2016).
169. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2016). The Human Rights Act of Missouri does not
protect against discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation. Id. The Chapter
includes protections against discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin,
ancestry, sex, disability, or familial status. Id.
170. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/safe_
school_laws (last visited Sep. 12, 2016).
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 1982 case, Sommers v. Budget
Marketing, ruled that the term “sex” was intended to be construed narrowly
and should not include transsexual or transgendered individuals within the
confines of discrimination based on sex. 171 However, in several lower district
courts as well as other circuit Courts of Appeals, this decision has been
questioned in the post-Price Waterhouse era. 172 These courts suggest that cases
such as Ulane 173 and Sommers are now rendered unhelpful to the analysis of
law the Court because the “narrow view” of the term sex in Title VII has since
been eviscerated by Price Waterhouse. 174
Without any further mention on how to interpret “sex” in the post-Price
Waterhouse era by the Court of Appeals, the Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri would likely refer to precedent set within its Circuit. In Rumble v.
Fairview Health Services, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota determined in a Title VII case that courts have broadly
characterized an individual’s transgender status as part of that individual’s
“sex” or “gender” identity, as a result of the ruling in Price Waterhouse. 175
This Eighth Circuit court rationalized that because the term “transgender”
describes people whose gender expression differs from their assigned sex at
birth, discrimination based on an individual’s transgender status constitutes
discrimination based on gender stereotyping within the precedent set forth in
Price Waterhouse. 176 Therefore, an individual’s transgender status is
necessarily part of his or her sex or gender identity when asserting a claim for
discrimination on the basis of sex. 177
The Court may also want to, in its analysis, take into account the concerns
of the parents of the female students at the school demanding privacy for their
young daughters. These parents have privacy concerns for their young
daughters that will not likely be easy to ignore. However, taking this into
account the precedent set forth within the district controlled by Price
Waterhouse as well as the guidance issued by federal officials, the Court would
certainly be inclined to rule in accordance with the view of gender neutrality
under Title IX. Despite the lack of state-level protections in Missouri for

171. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). “[For] the purposes of Title
VII the plain meaning must be ascribed to the term “sex” in absence of clear congressional intent
to do otherwise. Furthermore, the legislative history does not show any intention to include
transsexualism in Title VII.” Id. at 750.
172. See Radtke v. Misc. Drivers & Helpers Union Local #638 Health, Welfare, Eye &
Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Minn. 2012) (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,
(6th Cir. 2004)).
173. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
174. Radtke, 867 F. Supp. at 1032 (emphasis added).
175. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31591, at *4 (D. Minn. 2015).
176. Id.
177. Id. at *5.
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transgendered individuals, a Missouri federal court analyzing Ms. Perry’s
hypothetical claim for discrimination would likely find in favor of Ms. Perry,
ruling that discrimination based on her gender identity constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX.
V. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
Despite federal officials’ assertions that barring students from restrooms
that match their gender identity is prohibited under Title IX, 178 it is evident
that, until recently, there was still no clear standard for states to apply when
assessing the “bathroom problem.” In 2016, a number of states attempted to
pass transgender bathroom bills into law, and two succeeded at the time of this
writing. 179 In March of 2016, North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory signed
into law the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, a bathroom bill. 180 The
Act requires students at North Carolina state schools to use the facilities that
coordinates with their biological sex, which the Act describes as the “physical
condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person’s birth
certificate.” 181 Even though there have been very few states to pass such a law,
this led to a dichotomy between state laws and guidance from departments of
the federal government, which directly contradict each other.
“There is a public interest in ensuring that all students, including
transgender students, have the opportunity to learn in an environment free of
sex discrimination.” 182 Without question, guidance by federal officials such as
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice had done little to
solve this issue. The lower-level courts continued to apply Title IX in cases of
transgender students in an inconstant manner. Although these courts have
expressed the three views of protections under Title IX as addressed above, it
seems that as the case law surrounding this issue evolves, the gender-neutral
view has become the official view of a significant amount of courts and federal
offices.
Recently, in August 2016, the Supreme Court temporarily blocked the
decision by the Fourth Circuit in Grimm 183 while it decided whether it would

178. See Statement of Interest of the United States, G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty.
Sch. Bd. (No. 4:15cv54), 2015 WL 5560190, ECF No. 28.
179. See e.g. H.R. 1008, 2016 Leg., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016); see also Greg Botelho & Wayne
Drash, South Dakota governor vetoes transgender bathroom bill, CNN (Mar. 2, 2016 1:51 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/01/us/south-dakota-transgender-bathroom-bill/.
180. H.B. 2, Gen. Assemb. of N.C., Second Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016).
181. Id.
182. See Statement of Interest of the United States, G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty.
Sch. Bd. (No. 4:15cv54), 2015 WL 5560190, ECF No. 28, at *2 (emphasis added).
183. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2015 WL 5560190
(E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2015) (discussed infra in Section II(C)).
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hear the case. 184 Meanwhile, federal Judge Reed O’Connor of the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a nationwide injunction
that blocked the Obama administration from enforcing new guidelines that
were intended to expand restroom access for transgender students across the
country. 185 The injunction kept transgender students from using school
bathrooms and other facilities that correspond with their gender identity. 186
In February 2017, the Trump administration decided not to challenge the
nationwide injunction issued in Texas et al. in court, ending the effort by the
Obama administration to change policy. 187 The United States Department of
Justice and Department of Education then issued a “Dear Colleague” letter
announcing that they were withdrawing the previous policy and guidance that
prohibitions on the basis of sex, under Title IX, require access to sexsegregated facilities on the basis of gender identity. 188 The letter states there
“must be due regard for the primary role of states and local school districts in
establishing educational policy,” 189 which directly supports President Trump’s
expressed views that this is a states’ rights issue. 190 Following the Trump
administration’s change in policy, the Supreme Court remanded Grimm back
to the lower courts for further review. 191
In order to create a uniform application of Title IX throughout the nation
and guarantee every student is protected from discrimination based on sex, a
federal rule needs to be created to address the protections of transgender
individuals. This federal rule should be in accordance with the gender-neutral
view of Title IX expressed by federal officials under the Obama
administration. It may directly address the bathroom problem, suggesting
transgender students may use the bathroom that associates with that of their
gender identity, or it may specifically state that transgender students may

184. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., No. 16A52, 579 U. S. ___, (Aug. 23, 2016) (on
application to recall and stay).
185. State of Texas, et al., v. United States of America, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 113459 (N.D. Tex Aug 21, 2016).
186. See id.
187. See Liam Stack, Trump Drops Defense of Obama Guidelines on Transgender Students,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/us/politics/trump-transgenderstudents-injunction.html?_r=0/.
188. US Dep’t of Justice & Dep’t of Ed., Dear Colleague Letter (February 22, 2017)
[hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
189. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 188, at 1.
190. See THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Press Briefing by Press
Secretary Sean Spicer #15 (Feb. 23, 2017).
191. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G, No. 16-273, 579 U.S. ___ (Mar. 6, 2017). “Judgment
VACATED and case REMANDED to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
for further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the Department of
Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.” Id. As of the time of this writing,
there has been no development in the lower courts on this matter.
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participate in any school event, class, or use any facility in accordance with
their gender identity. This type of rule has the ability to solve a massive
inequality within the current school systems, and is winning favor with many
proponents of civil rights and state Human Rights Commissions.
Whether the Supreme Court will get another opportunity in the next few
years to grant certiorari on an issue like this is not certain. It is also uncertain
how the Justices would rule on such an issue, due to the recent change in
policy by the Department of Justice and Department of Education. However, in
the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, 192 where the Supreme Court took a genderblind approach and ruled that the fundamental right to marry is also guaranteed
to same-sex couples, this type of rule may not be so far off. It may even come
down to an adoption of new federal legislation on this issue, if the issue does
not appear before the Supreme Court. The application of Title IX is not a
states’ right issue. The rights and privileges associated with public education
cannot and has not been a states’ rights issue for over half a century. As
evidenced in long-standing precedent Brown v. Board of Education, all
students deserve equal protection of the law, not separation based on some
personal characteristic or trait. 193
Realistically, the Supreme Court may not grant certiorari to a case similar
to Grimm following its remand in March, so the judiciary might not end up
being the creator of such a federal ruling. Whether it be through a new
legislation, or amending Title IX to include transgender as a protected class,
there may come a time when the legislature will need to step in and set the
controlling rule on this issue. Regardless of how this proposed new federal rule
might come about, it is time for someone to step in and stand up for the
equality of all students in their protections against discriminations on the basis
of sex in the educational system.
KELLY SMALLMON *

192. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 1039 (2015).
193. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) “We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.” Id. at 495.
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